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ABOLITION OF BREACH OF PROMISE IN WISCONSIN-
SCOPE AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
Wisconsin has recently abolished the action for breach of promise
to marry.' The reasons given for this legislation is that the action
"does not encourage stable marriages, and . . . sanctions conduct that
borders on extortion."2 The purpose of this article is to consider the
constitutional validity of this new act, and to consider to what extent
traditional grounds for seeking remedies at law are included, within
this legislative prohibition.
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ABOLISHMENT OF COMMON LAW ACTION
Wilder v. Reno was the first case to express doubts concerning the
constitutionality of such legislation.3 An Illinois resident sought to
enjoin the Attorney-General of Pennsylvania from applying the penal-
ty provision of the Pennsylvania 'Heart-Balm' act. The court dis-
missed the petition on the grounds of insufficient evidence to show the
threatened application of the penal provision. However, by way of
dicta, the court stated:
This court has serious doubt concerning the constitutionality
of the entire Act in question and its penal provisions, because,
first, the Act appears to take away fundamental common-law
rights ... secondly, it appears to violate the obligations of con-
tracts and to destroy vested rights without due process of law.
The penal provision is especially obnoxious because it attempts
to bar resort to the courts to test the constitutionality of the
Act.4
A. IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT RIGHTS
Actions for breach of promise to marry were cognizable at common
law when damages, instead of fulfillment of the promises, were
sought.5 Actions for breach thereof were based on the common law
action of assumpsit. Like any other contract, there was an offer, an
acceptance, and consideration which was the mutuality of the two
promises. Wisconsin has always recognized that an action for breach
of promise to marry is an action on contract, for which the law will
1 Chap. 595, Laws of 1959 (Effective date, Jan. 1, 1960) :
248.01 "All causes of action for breach of contract to marry are hereby
abolished, except that this section shall not apply to contracts now existng or
to causes of action which heretofore accrued."
248.02 "No act hereafter done within this state shall operate to give rise,
either within or without this state, to any of the causes of action abolished by
this chapter. No contract to marry, which shall hereafter be made in this state,
shall operate to give rise, either within or without this state, to any cause of
action for breach thereof, and any such acts and contracts are hereby ren-
dered ineffective to support or give rise to any such causes of action, within
or without this state."
2 V, General Report, Wisconsin Legislative Council, 1959, Bill No. 151A, at 70.
3 43 F. Supp. 727 (D.C. Pa. 1942).
4 Id. at 728.
3 Holcroft v. Dickenson, 124 Eng. Rep. 933 (1672).
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give a remedy.6 When this right to bring an action on contract is taken
away by the legislature, the question naturally arises whether the act
is an impairment of contract rights as prohibited by both the federal
and Wisconsin constitutions ?7
The leading case upholding the right of the legislature to abolish
breach of promise actions is Fearon v. Treanor.s In an action for
breach of promise, the New York Court of Appeals pointed out the
power of the legislature to regulate and control the marriage institu-
tion. However, it is important to note that it was not denied that the
abolition of breach of promise actions impaired the obligation of con-
tracts.
Legislation which impairs the obligation of a contract or
otherwise deprives a person of his property can be sustained
only when enacted for the promotion of the general good of the
public, the protection of the lives, health, morals, comfort and
general welfare of the people and when the means adopted to
secure that end are reasonable. 9 [Emphasis Added].
The court then justified its decision on the broad grounds that the
legislature had plenary power when dealing with the subject of mar-
riage as an exercise of the state's police power for the protection of
the public welfare."°
The following year, in Hanfgarn v. Mark, the same court upheld
the right of the legislature to abolish actions for alienation of affec-
tions and criminal conversation." The justification for this decision
was that the abolition of these two actions did not ilmpair contract
obligations. The court pointed out that the marriage contract itself had
long been considered an institution rather than an ordinary contract
within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. Since the mar-
riage contract was not within the constitutional prohibition, rights
which grow out of the marriage contract also were not within its
scope.
12
" Dauphin v. Landrigan, 187 Wis. 633, 205 N.W. 557 (1925).
7 U.S. Const. art. I, §10: "No state ... shall pass any . . . law impairing the
obligation of contracts.'.v." Vis. Const. art. I, §12: "No bill of attainder, ex
post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever
be passed, ..."
1272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E. 2d 815 (1936); rehearing denied 273 N.Y. 528, 7 N.E.
2d 677 (1937) ; appeal dismissed 301 U.S. 667 (1937) ; rehearing denied 302
U.S. 744 (1937).
9 People v. Title & Mortgage Guarantee Co., 264 N.Y. 69, 190 N.E. 153, 157(1934) ; quoted in Fearon v. Treanor, Id. at 817.
10 Fearon v. Treanor, supra note 8, at 817:"The Legislature acting within its
authority, has determined as a matter of public policy that marriages should
not be entered into because of the threat or danger of an action to recover
money damages and the embarrassment and humiliation growing out of such
an action."
11 274 N.Y. 22, 8N.E. 2d 47 (1937) ; remittitur amended 274 N.Y. 570, 10 N.E.
2d 556 (1937) ; appeal dismissed 302 U.S. 641 (1937).
12 "Not being a common law contract ,the [marriage] relation may be regulated,
controlled, and modified and rights growing out of the relationship may be
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Therefore, in Fearon v. Treanor, New York implied that the aboli-
tion of breach of promise actions was an impairment, while in Hafgarn
v. Mark, the abolition of actions for alienation and criminal conversa-
tion was not. The reason for this difference was recognized by the
court in the Hafgarn case: "An action to recover damages for breach
of promise to marry is based upon an agreement preliminary to mar-
riage and an action to recover damages for alienation of affections and
criminal conversation is founded upon thhe marriage relationship it-
self." 13  Consequently, since promises to marry and its subsequent
breach does not result in a marriage contract or relationship, that con-
tract and its breach never rises above the ordinary contract to the sta-
tus of an institution. Conversely, alienation of affections and criminal
conversation, presuppose a marriage contract, and rights thereof grow
out of the marriage institution rather than out of an ordinary contract
within the constitutional prohibition .
The basis for this distinction is even more clear when compared
with Maynard v. Hill, the leading case in which the United States Su-
preme Court held that the marriage contract was outside the scope of
the constitutional prohibition.
It is also to be observed that, whilst marriage is often termed
by text writers and in decisions of courts a civil contract ... it
is something more than a mere contract. The consent of the
parties is of course essential to its existence, but when the con-
tract to marry is executed by the marriage, a relation between
the parties is created which they cannot change. Other contracts
may be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released
upon the consent of the parties. Not so with marriage. The re-
lation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to
various obligations and liabilities.
1 4
Though the promise of marriage may not be changed by the mutual
consent of the parties, the promise to marry before it is "executed"
may be "modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the
consent of the parties."
This basic distinction in the nature of the various Heart Balm
actions has been overlooked in other jurisdictions. Since most legisla-
tive acts encompass alienation of affections, criminal conversation,
seduction, and breach of promise in one act, courts have frequently
passed on the constitutionality of the entire statute when considering
modified or abolished by the Legislature without violating the provisions of
the Federal and State Constitutions which forbid the taking of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law." Id. at 48.
1Id. at 47. See also Young v. Young, 236 Ala. 627, 184 So. 187, 190 (1938):
"Actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation are both based
on the marriage relation-being actions for the loss of consortium between
the spouses from the wrongful acts of others."
14 125 U.S. 190, 210-211 (1888).
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only one of the four actions. 15 Other courts have applied the reasoning
from alienation of affections cases to breach of promise actions, con-
cluding that the abolishment of breach of promise actions was constitu-
tional since the promise to marry is not an ordinary contract and
consequently not within the protection of the constitution, citing May-
nard v. Hill and Hanfgarn v. Mark.1 6
B. JUSTIFICATION-THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
Although Fearon v. Treanor held that the New York Heart Balm
act impaired the obligation of contracts, it was justified on the grounds
that the police power of the state could regulate the marriage relation-
ship and agreements preliminary to it.17 This received full expression
in a New Jersey case:
The police power, as has so often been said, is an attribute
of sovereignity and is inherent in every state. The power escapes
exact definition, yet all rights and property are subject to it.
Whatever is harmful to the public welfare may be restrained or
prohibited, for the police power extends to the protection of the
public peace, good order and morals.
The legislature made an extended declaration of public policy
in the preamble of the 'Heart Balm' Act. The purpose of the
legislation was stated to be the prevention of fraud, extortion,
oppression and abuse of process. Such ends fall within the ambit
of the police power of the State, so that legislation which will
secure or tend to secure the public against the consequences of
fraud, extortion, oppression and abuse of power is constitu-
tional.18
Pennington v. Stewart, 9 reiterated the right of the legislature to
regulate marriage and actions relative to the marriage relationship as
a valid legislative purpose enacted for the benefit of the general public.
Being a valid area in which the legislature could act, the enactment of
the Heart Balm act was a declaration of public policy that the legisla-
tive purpose could only be accomplished successfully by the elimination
of the action entirely.20 Consequently, since there was a valid legislative
purpose, and since there was a reasonable connection between the
enactment and the purpose to be accomplished, the legislature could
"validly abolish a common law right or remedy, prospectively, without
furnishing an adequate substitute. '2 1
15 Bunten v. Bunten, 15 N.J. Mis. R. 532, 192 Atl. 727 (1937), upholding the con-
stitutionality of the entire act when passing on the merits of an action for
alienation of affections.1 6 Langdon v. Sayre, 74 Cal. App. 2d 41, 168 P. 2d 57 (1946) ; Rotwein v. Ger-
sten, 160 Fla. 736, 36 So. 2d 419 (1948).
17 Supra, note 8.
18 Magierowski v. Buckley, 39 N.J. Super. 534, 121 A. 2d 749, 763 (1956).
19 212 Ind. 553, 10 N.E. 2d 619 (1937).
20 Chiyoko Ikuta v. Shunji K. Ikuta, 97 Cal. App. 2d 787, 218 P. 2d 854 (1954).
21 Magierowski v. Buckley, supra, note 18, at 761.
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Wisconsin has long recognized the power of the legislature to regu-
late the marriage relationship. In passing on the constitutionality of
the eugenics law, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared in Peterson
v. Widule:
The power of the state to control and regulate by reasonable
laws the marriage relation, and to prevent the contracting of
marriage by persons afflicted with loathsome or hereditary dis-
eases, which are liable either to be transmitted to the spouse or
inherited by the offspring, or both, must on principle be regard-
ed as undeniable.
22
This power of the legislature was again recognized in Kitzinan v.
Kitzman, where the court upheld the denial to an epileptic of the right
to marry.2 3
Further, the exercise of the police power of the state has been
specifically recognized in Wisconsin as justifying the abolition of a
common law right.24 The Wisconsin Constitution itself provides for
the alteration of the common law by legislative enactments. 25 In decid-
ing this question, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared:
In this state, both by the constitution and judicial decision,
it is settled that those parts of the common law which were in
force at the time of the adoption of the constitution and were
not inconsistent therewith remained in force until changed by
the legislature .... Where private property rights were founded
upon and preserved by any part of the common law so in force,
they could not be taken away or impaired by mere legislative
enactment, but only for public purposes by the exercise of emi-
nent domain, or by the exercise of the police power for the pro-
tection of the public.26 [Emphasis Added].
It is a well established principle of Wisconsin constitutional law,
however, that the broad police power of the state will not justify a
violation of an expressed limitation of the constitution, but rather,
the police power must be exercised in subordination to it.27 Therefore,
although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized the right of the
legislature to regulate the marriage institution and its incidences; and
has also recognized the validity of the police power in altering common
law rights; the essential question is whether the Supreme Court will
22 157 Wis. 641, 647, 147 N.W. 966, 968 (1914).
23 167 Wis. 308, 166 N.W. 789 (1918).
24 Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354 (1903).
25 Wis. Const. art. 14, §13: "Such parts of the common law as are now in force
in the Territory of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this constitution, shall
be and continue part of the law of this state until altered or suspended by the
legislature."
26 Huber v. Merkel, supra, note 24, at 364-365.
27 "An act which the constitution dearly prohibits is beyond the power of the
legislature, however proper it might be as a police regulation but for such
prohibition." State ex rel Jones v. Froehlich, 115 Wis. 32, 42, 91 N.W. 115,
118 (1902). See also State ex rel Milwaukee Medical College v. Chittenden,
127 Wis. 468, 107 N.W. 500 (1906).
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uphold the exercise of the police power when the right which is abo-
lished is a common law right to a remedy at law for a previously
recognized wrong?
C. RIGHT TO REMEDY AT LAW FOR INJURY TO PERSON,
PROPERTY, OR CHARACTER
Article I, section 9, of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: "Every
person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character;
... conformably to the laws."32 - It is significant to note that New York,
New Jersey, and California, which uphold the constitutionailty of
their acts upon the broad exercise of the police power of the state, do
not have comparable provisions in their state constitutions. Two states
that have this constitutional provision and have enacted Heart Baln
acts are Illinois and Indiana.
2 9
The Illinois Heart Balm act is distinguishable from all others in
that it did not abolish the cause of action, but simply made it unlawful
to file the action.30 In Dailey v. Parker, the federal district court held
that the law making it unlawful to file an action for alienation of
affections and criminal conversation was unconstitutional.3 1  After
noting that the Illinois legislature had not followed the general practice
of abolishing the action itself, it concluded:
The marriage contract has always been considered in our law
one of the most important contracts, and to deny any one ag-
grieved the right to sue for breach thereof, and to make it un-
lawful even to assert such a right, seems clearly to contravene
the Constitution of this State, which secures to all a remedy for
every wrong.32
The following year the Illinois Supreme Court declared the Act uncon-
stitutional in Heck v. Schupp, where it was again declared that civil
rights arising out of contracts could not be abolished by legislative
enactment."
The major criticism of the Illinois Act was that it failed to elimi-
nate the cause of action, but rather left it without any satisfaction. 4
It is difficult to see how the abolishment of the cause of action would
have permitted the act to shed its unconstitutional qualities. Since no
28 Wis. Const. art. I, §9: "Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the
laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property
or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged
to purchase it, completely and without denial promptly and without delay,
conformably to the laws."
29 Ii. Const. art. 2, §19; Ind. Const. art. 1, §12.
3o Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, chap. 38, 1246.
-1 61 F. Supp. 701 (D.C. Ill. 1945).
32 Id. at 703.
33 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E. 2d 464 (1946).
34 Rotwein v. Gersten, supra, note 16.
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statute forbids entering into a contract to marry, the right to seek a
remedy at law for its wrongful breach is violated when either it is
unlawful to file an action, or when the right of action is removed
entirely. In either case, the "injury or wrong" resulting from the
wrongful breach of a lawful contract is left without legal satisfaction."
In Corpus Juris Secundum it is stated that although this type of
constitutional provision is not considered as preventing legislatures
from modifying the common law, courts are divided on the question
whether it prohibits the legislature from abolishing entirely a common
law action for injuries to person or property.3" Those courts upholding
the power of the legislature have interpreted this constitutional provi-
sion as a limitation applicable to the judicial branch only. Included in
this category is Indiana, so that its Heart Balm act could be upheld
Pennington v. Stewart.37  This interpretation has been rejected in
Wisconsin, where article I, section 9, has long been held to apply
with equal force to the legislative branch.
The result of the cases seems to be that the legislature may
alter or vary existing remedies as it pleases, provided that in so
doing their nature and extent is not so changed as materially to
impair the rights and interests of creditors.3 8
In addition, this constitutional provision has been interpreted as pro-
tecting remedies which are founded upon the common law.30 It was
in the light of this interpretation that the Supreme Court held the
abolition of the right to sue a county government for the negligent acts
of its agents was constitutional, since the original right to sue a county
government was not recognized at common law, but on the contrary,
was the creation of a right by a prior legislative act which could be
revoked.40 The justification for this decision was the conclusion that
the words "injuries or wrongs" of article I, section 9, had reference
only to remedies which existed under the common law."'
Therefore, an examination of the Wisconsin interpretation of arti-
35 "Whatever belongs merely to the remedy, may be altered according to the
will of the state, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of
contract. But if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done
by acting on the remedy, or directly on the contract itself. In either case it
is prohibited by the Constitution." Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559, 578
(1859). See also State ex rel Wickham v. Nygaard, 159 Wis. 396, 150 NAN'.
513 (1915).
36 16 C.J.S. Const. Law §709(e) (1937).
3 Supra, note 19.
38 Von Baumbach v. Bade, supra, note 35, at 579.
39 M\cCoy v. Kenosha County, 195 Wis. 273, 277, 218 N.W. 348, 350-351 (1928)
where in discussing phrase 'conformably to the laws' the court stated: "That
phrase, like the one 'due process of law,' must mean, as the latter phrase has
repeatedly been held to mean, to relate to a recognized, long established, sys-
tem of laws existing in the several states adopting the constitution as well as
in the prior organizations from which the states were organized."
40 Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Washburn County, 2 Wis. 2d 214, 85 N.W. 2d 840 (1957).
41 Id. at 224, 85 N.W. 2d at 845, citing McCoy v. Kenosha County, supra, note 39.
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cle I, section 9, discloses that it limits the extent to which a legislative
enactment can remove the right to seek a remedy at law for an injury
or wrong recognized at common law. Von Baumnbach v. Bade declares
the test of the constitutionality of this legislation to be: If the legisla-
tive act materially impairs the remedy, the act is unconstitutional; but
if the legislative act leaves the parties with a "substantial remedy," it
does not violate the constitution. 2 Consequently, for the Wisconsin
legislature to validly abolish the common law breach of promise action,
as a valid exercise of the state's police power, it is essential that Wis-
consin faced with a state constitutional provision unlike any found in
New York, New Jersey, or California, must leave a substantial remedy
available to the injured party.
II. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO PARTIES INJURED BY A
BREACH OF PROMISE
Remedies left available to injured parties, not abolished by chapter
248 of the new Wisconsin Family Code are: (A) Actions to recover
gifts made in contemplation of marriage after the engagement has
been broken. (B) Actions for damages for seduction when consent to
the intercourse is obtained by a fraudulent promise of marriage. (C)
Actions for deceit to recover financial losses incurred in reliance on a
fraudulent promise of marriage. (D) Actions to recover for severe
mental disturbance caused by an outrageous breach of the promise to
marry.
A. RECOVERY OF GIFTS MADE IN CONTEMPLATION OF MARRIAGE
Jurisdictions rely on four legal theories to permit recovery of gifts
or their value, given during the engagement period. Such gifts are
usually rings, heirlooms, furniture, and money to establish a common
household.
The most common basis used for recovery is that of conditional
gifts. The gift is viewed as passing on the condition that it will be
returned if the donee breaks the engagement, or the betrothal is mutu-
ally dissolved. 43 Whether the gift is conditional is ordinarily a question
of intention, determined by express declarations of the donor, or most
usually from circumstances surrounding the transaction. 44 At the time
of making the gift parties are seldom conscious of imposing conditions
upon it, but courts imply conditions liberally to achieve what invariably
are desirable results.
A second basis for allowing recovery is the doctrine of restitution.
If there is an engagement to marry and the donee, having re-
ceived the gift without fraud, later wrongfully breaks the
42 Supra, note 35, at 578-580.




promise of marriage, the donor is entitled to restitution if the
gift is an engagement ring, a family heirloom, or other similar
thing intimately connected with the marriage, but not if the gift
is one of money intended to be used by the donee before the
marriage.
45
This section further provides that the donor is entitled to recover his
money if it has been obtained by fraud. This theory is similar to the
conditional gift theory, where courts liberally imply conditions to pre-
vent unjust enrichment.
A third basis for recovery is statutory. A California statute46
allows recovery of the gift when the donee refuses to enter into the
marriage, or the engagement is dissolved by mutual consent. A Lou-
isiana statute 7 has been construed to allow recovery of all gifts given
in contemplation of a marriage which does not take place, regardless
of who is at fault in terminating the engagement. 48
The fourth basis for granting recovery is deceit.4 9 This is the most
difficult theory on which to base a recovery, because an intent not to
perform the promise to marry at the time it was made must be proven."
The mere breach is not enough to establish the fraudulent intent, but
the intent must be inferred from other circumstances.51 This theory
gives no protection to the victim of a non-fraudulent promise.
L The general effect of "Heart-Barn" acts on gift recovery actions.
Generally statutes abolishing actions for breach of promise to marry
have been construed not to abolish actions for the return of engage-
ment gifts. A different result was reached in the case of Andie v.
Kaplan,52 where plaintiff brought an action to recover money and
jewelry delivered by him to defendant, in connection with a mutual
promise to marry. Although plaintiff alleged fraud in his complaint,
and that the money had been delivered in trust, the complaint was
45 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, §58, comment c (1937).46 Cal. Civ. Code §1590 (Deering 1959). "When either party to a contemplated
marriage in this state make a gift of money or property to the other on the
basis or assumption that the marriage will take place in the event that the
donee refuses to enter into the marriage as contemplated or that it is given
up by mutual consent, the donor may recover such gift or such part of its
value as may, under all of the circumstances of the case, be found by a court
or jury to be just."
47 La. Rev. Civ. Code, art. 1740 (1940). "Every donation made in favor of
marriage falls, if the marriage does not take place."
4sWardlaw v. Conrad, 18 La. App. 387, 137 So. 603 (1931).
49 Mack v. White, 97 Cal. App. 2d 497, 218 P. 2d 76 (1950).
50 Hill v. Thomas, 140 S.W. 2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
51 PRossER, ToRTs, §90 (2d ed. 1955). Among the circumstances listed which may
be enough to establish the fraudulent intent are: circumstances which show
the promisor knew at the time of making the promise that he could not per-
form it; his repudiation of the promise soon after it is made with no inter-
vening change in the situation; his failure even to attempt a performance; or




dismissed on the ground that the cause of action stated was based on a
breach of promise to marry, and therefore prohibited by the New York
Civil Practice Act.53 However, the dissent in the Appellate Division
opinion highlighted the reasoning subsequently used by other jurisdic-
tions in allowing such recoveries.
The claim for the value of the jewelry arises out of the breach
of promise to marry, but it does not come within the spirit of
the statute. To deny recovery would be to justify an unjust
enrichment of a wrongdoer. The purpose of the new legislation
was to prevent a recovery for alleged pecuniary loss, blighted
affections, wounded pride, humiliation, and the like, against the
one who violated the promise, but not to enable the later to re-
ceive benefits out of his willful act.
5 4
The majority position was re-affirmed in a subsequent memorandum
decision of the Court of Appeals on facts similar to the Andic case."5
These decisions have produced unfair results. In Reinhardt v.
Schuster,5 " defendant received a ring from plaintiff to take home to
show her parents preparatory to the announcement of their engage-
ment. Subsequently defendant became reluctant to return to Texas
where plaintiff was established and insisted that plaintiff come to
Brookyln, marry her there, and attempt to establish himself there so
that she could be near her parents. On plaintiff's refusal, defendant
broke the engagement. Although title to the ring had never passed to
defendant, it was held that plaintiff's action was essentially based on a
promise of marriage, and therefore the action was not maintainable.
In Nosonowitz v. Kahn,57 defendant broke an engagement to marry
and returned the ring to plaintiff. Later, on the same day, plaintiff
asked defendant to reconsider her decision, and re-delivered the ring
to her, expressly conditional upon her promise to return it if she
decided not to become re-engaged. Defendant decided not to become
re-engaged to plaintiff, but refused to return his ring. Even though
plaintiff intended to vest title in defendant only if she would promise
to marry him the court viewed this as an action arising out of a breach
of contract to marry, falling within the bar of the act.
This New York position has been criticised.5s In Grishen v. Dorno-
galski,59 although recovery was denied, the court expressed disapproval
with this state of the law.
53 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §61-a, 61-b, and 61-d.
5432 N.Y.S. 2d 429, 430 (1942).
55 Josephson v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, 266 App. Div. 992, 45 N.Y.S. 2d
120, aff'd mere. 292 N.Y. 666, 56 N.E. 2d 96 (1944).
5G 81 N.Y.S. 2d 570 (App. Div. 1948).
57 106 N.Y.S. 2d 836 (Munic. Ct. City of N.Y. 1951).
rs 13 Brooklyn L. Rev. 174 (1947); 3 Wyo. L. J. 147 (1949) ; 3 Vill. L. Rev.(1958); 1947 Annual Survey of the American Law 845; N.Y. Law Revision
Commission, Report, Recommendation, and Studies (1947), p.p. 223-247.
59 191 Misc. 365, 80 N.Y.S. 2d 484 (N.Y. City Ct. 1948).
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It does not seem just or logical that engaged couples who pool
their resources for the purpose of buying or furnishing a home,
or to meet the expenses of the marriage, should have no recourse
in the event a mutual termination of the engagement results in a
refusal to redivide the money or property so involved. This is
wholly different from the evil of prospective damages by way
of 'heart balm' for breach of promise of marriage which the
Legislature sought to forever ban by the enactment of the legis-
lation in question.
In 1947 both houses of the New York Legislature passed a bill
repealing this interpretation of the Heart Balm act.60 This bill was
vetoed by the governor without a veto message.
Other jurisdictions have held that statutes abolishing actions for
breach of promise to marry do not abolist actions for the recovery
of engagement gifts. California allowed recovery in Norman v.
Burks"' without mentioning §1590 of their Civil Code which specifi-
cally allows such recoveries.6 2 In Beberman v. Segal,6" New Jersey
allowed recovery by distinguishing recovery of a conditional gift from
damages for a breach of contract to marry. New Hampshire permitted
plaintiff to recover on the theory of restitution.
It was not the intention of the New Hampshire Legislature in
outlawing breach of promise suits to permit the unjust enrich-
ment of persons to whom property had been transferred while
the parties enjoyed a confidential relationship. To so construe
the statute would be to permit the unjust enrichment which the
statute is designed to prevent.0 '
Massachusetts, despite the earlier decision of Thibault v. Lalu-
miere2 which leaned toward the New York view, recently allowed
recovery in the case of De Cicco v. Barker.6  In Pavlic v. Vogts-
berger6 7 Pennsylvania allowed an 80 year old man to recover money
60 1947 Legis. Doc. No. 65 (j). "(61j) This article shall not be deemed to pre-
vent a court in a proper case from granting restitution of property or money
transferred in contemplation of the performance of an agreement to marry
which is not performed."
6193 Cal. App. 2d 687, 209 P. 2d 815 (1949).
62 Supra, note 46.
63 6 N.J. Super. 472, 69 A. 2d 587 (1949).
6496 N.H. 177, 71 A. 2d 785 (1950).
65 31 Mass. 72, 60 N.E. 2d 349 (1945).
66 
-Mass.-, 159 N.E. 2d 534 (1959).
67390 Pa. 502, 136 A. 2d 127 (1957). "It (the Heart Balm act) in no way alters
the law of conditional gifts. A gift given by a man to a woman on condition
that she embark on the sea of matrimony with him is no different from a gift
based on the condition that the donee sail on any other sea. If, after receiving
the provisional gift, the donee refuses to leave the harbor,-if the anchor of
contractual performance sticks in the sands of irresolution and procrastina-
tion-the gift must be restored to the donor. ...
"The appellant in her argument before this court would want to make of
the Act of June 22, 1935, a device to perpetuate one of the very vices the Act
was designed to prevent. The Act was passed to avert the perpetration of
fraud by adventurers and adventuresses in the realm of heartland. To allow
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and other gifts from his 26 year old girl friend who had fraudulently
led him on by her promises of marriage.
2. The effect of Chapter 248 on gift actions in Wisconsin.
In view of the criticism of the New Yorw rule, and the well rea-
soned, more recent cases in other jurisdictions allowing the donor to
recover gifts despite Heart Balm acts, it is doubted that Wisconsin
would construe 248.0168 as abolishing these actions. Wisconsin con-
strues statutes in derogation of the common law strictly," and strictly
construed the statute would not bar gift actions. The Wisconsin sta-
tute is taken almost verbatim from the Pennsylvania statute abolish-
ing breach of promise actions and Pennsylvania has held that their
statute does not abolish action for the recovery of engagement gifts.70
However, Section 248.0671 creates a doubt as to this otherwise
probable construction of the Heart-Balm act allowing recovery of
gifts. The statute expressly allows recovery of property obtained by
fraudulent promises of marriage. It could be argued that the Legisla-
ture intended 248.01 to abolish actions for the recovery of gifts, as well
as actions for breach of promise in all instances except that enume-
rated in 248.06, when the gift was obtained by fraud. It could also be
argued that the Legislature intended to permit only recovery of the
gift, rather than damages for deceit or conversion of the article.
Section 248.06 should not have this effect. That statute is phrased
in negative terms, it provides that "Actions for the recovery of pro-
perty . . . procured by . . . fraud . . . are not barred." Common law
rules are not to be changed by doubtful implication. -7 2 It appears that
Sara Jane to retain the money and property which she got from George by
dangling before him the grapes of matrimony which she never intended to let
him pluck would be to place a premium on trickery, cunning, and duplicitous
dealing. It would be to make a mockery of the law enacted by the Legisla-
ture in that very field of happy and unhappy hunting....
"Thus the law of 1935 prohibited, but prohibited only the suing for dam-
ages based on contused feelings, sentimental bruises, wounded pride, untoward
embarrassment, social humiliation, and all types of mental and emotional suf-
fering presumably arising from a broken marital promise. The Act does not
in any way ban actions resulting from a tangible loss due to the breach of a
legal contract."6
s Supra, note 1.
6 Laridaen v. Railway Express Agency, 259 Wis. 178, 47 N.W .2d 727 (1951).
7048 P.S. §171 (Purdon 1959). "Actions for breach of promise to marry abol-
ished. All causes of action for breach of contract to marry are hereby
abolished: Provided, however, That this section shall not apply to contracts
now existing or to causes of action which heretofore accrued."
71 Wis. Stat. §248.06 (1959). "Actions for the recovery of property received by
one party from the other after the alleged contract to marry and before the
breach thereof, which was procured by such party by his or her fraud in
representing to the other that he or she intended to marry the other and not
to breach the contract to marry, are not barred by this chapter; but such
actions must be commenced within one year after the breach of the contract
to marry and the cause must be shown by affirmative proof aside from the
testimony of the party seeking recovery."
72 Leach v. Leach, 261 Wis. 350, 52 N.W. 2d 896 (1952).
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this statute is merely declaratory of the common law and is not intend-
ed to provide an exclusive remedy.
Further, abolishing actions to recover gifts would not better effec-
tuate the purpose of Chapter 248.73 This chapter was designed to
prevent extortionary law suits, and to abolish encouragement to marry
which the law may previously have given to parties of an unhappy
betrothal.74 There is little scandal which could furnish material for
extortion involved in a property action. Once the engagement is bro-
ken, it is difficult to see how the return of gifts would encourage par-
ties to enter an undesirable marriage.
Other states have not distinguished recovery of the gift from re-
covery of its monetary value in allowing or denying the donor's suit.
If the donor were limited to recover only the gift itself, he might be
denied a remedy if the article had been damaged, or was no longer in
defendant's possession. If the gift is retained after the donor demands
its return, he should be allowed damages for its conversion. If the
gift were obtained by defendant's fraudulent promise of marriage,
plantiff should recover damages for deceit.
It is doubtful construction to imply a legislative purpose to allow
an unjust enrichment, merely because fraud cannot be proven. The
non-defrauded suitor would be totally denied a remedy, even though
his cause is invariably equitable. Even the defrauded suitor would
have difficulty in establishing his case. Intent not to perform the
promise at the time it was made is difficult to prove.75 When the dis-
advantage is added of requiring him to show his cause by affirmative
proof aside from his own testimony, the burden in many cases would
be insurmountable. In a confidential relationship such as a marriage
engagement, evidence of circumstances showing fraudulent intent at
the time of the promise would normally be available only by the testi-
mony of the party seeking recovery. Thus 248.06 provides relief only
in the most extreme cases of injustice, and is not adequate, by itself,
to do complete justice in pre-marital gift cases.
B. RECOVERY FOR SEDUCTION INDUCED BY A FRAUDULENT
PROMISE OF MARRIAGE.
Under certain circumstances a woman may recover for her own
seduction, as she formerly could as an aggravating circumstance in a
breach of promise suit, despite the Heart-Balm act. At common law a
73 Wis. Stat. §248.08 (1959). "This chapter shall be liberally construed to
effectuate the object thereof."
74 V, General Report, Wisconsin Legislative Council, 1959, p. 73, Bill No. 151 A,
p. 67. "The action for breach of promise encourages marriages that should
not take place and its abolishment is in keeping with the philosophy that
legislation should be designed to promote the stability in marriage. As a
remedy which permits monetary recory (sic) the action sanctions conduct
that borders on extortion."
75 Supra, note 51.
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woman could not recover for her own seduction in an independeni
action, although she could recover for it indirectly as an element of
damages in a breach of promise suit.76 The woman herself was barred
from recovery because she had consented to the tort committed upon
her. 77 There are five exceptions to this rule. 1. In some jurisdictions
the woman is given a statutory right to sue for her own seduction,
despite her consent.7 Wisconsin has no such statute and has never
allowed the woman herself to recover in the common law action for
seduction. 2. Under criminal statutes, such as 944.10, 79 fixing the age
of consent for the crime of rape, the consent of an under-age girl is
not a defense to the battery committed upon her, and she can personally
recover for the battery, in a civil action, because the statute was intend-
ed to protect a limited class of individuals from their own lack of
judgment.8 0 3. Consent to intercourse might not be a defense in a
civil action for battery because non-marital intercourse is a crime.
Consent by one person to allow another person to perform an
unlawful act upon such person does not constitute a defense to
an action to recover the actual damages which such person
thereby received."
To recover under this theory, however, plaintiff apparently must suffer
some actual physical injury beyond the mere indignity from the contact
itself.8 2 4. A woman can recover against a person who has induced
her to have illicit sexual relations by fraudulent representations. The
fraud vitiates the consent. This theory has two aspects. The authori-
ties agree that if the nature of the act has been misrepresented, con-
sent to a battery is vitiated, and plaintiff can recover for the me:'e con-
tact. 3 However, when the fraud is in the inducement, collateral to the
nature of the act, recovery may be had only when actual bodily harm
results. 84 It could be argued that the act of non-marital intercourse
,6 47 Am. Jur., Seduction, §80 (1937).
77 PROSSER, TORTS, §18 (2d ed. 1955).7  See 4 Vernier, American Family Laws, 267 (1936).
79 \Vis. Stat. §944.10 (1959).
'0 PROSSER, TORTS, §18 (2d ed. 1955).
s Miller v. Bayer, 94 Wis. 123, 127, 68 N.W. 869 (1896). But see Colcin v. Mil-
burn, 176 F. Supp. 946 (D.C. N.J. 1959). "Of course the express provision
of Section 7 of the New Jersey Heart Balm act . . . prevents the application
of the principle that a criminal prohibition often implies a civil remedy in the
person injured by one criminal act. N.J.S.A. 2A: 23-7 provides, "Nothing
contained in this chapter [the Heart Balm act] shall be construed as a repeal
of any of the provisions of the penal law or the criminal procedure law or
of any other law of the state relating to criminal or quasi-criminal actions or
proceedings."
S2 4 Am. Jur. Assault and Battery, §83 (1937).
'- PROSSER, TORTS, §18 (2d ed. 1955) ; 1 Harper & James, Torts, §3.10 (1956)
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §57, comment b (1934).
'14 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §57, comment b (1934). "An interest in freedom from
bodily harm is protected from any form of conduct which is intended or
likely to cause it. Therefore, while the fraudulently procured assent protects
the actor from liability predicated upon the mere fact that the contact has
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when the parties are engaged is substantially different than the act
between non-engaged persons.85 A fraudulent promise of marriage
would thus go to the nature of the act itself. If this could not be estab-
lished, the fraudulent promise would be collateral and plaintiff could
recover only for her actual injuries. 5. Plaintiff might be able to re-
cover for her personal injury in an action for deceit. Although the
tort action for deceit is normally used to recover economic damages, 81
it has been used to recover for personal injuries."" Wisconsin has never
limited the action for deceit to economic losses. It would seem super-
fluous, however, to base a recovery for seduction on deceit, if the mis-
representation involved vitiates the consent to the battery.
A statute abolishing actions for breach of promise to marry should
have no effect on the common law action for seduction, or the first
three exceptions to the consent rule. A promise to marry is not an
operative fact in these recoveries. Wisconsin has no statute allowing
recovery under the first exception, and there are obvious policy rea-
sons for forbidding recovery for illegal intercourse under the third
theory.8 8 Therefore an adult plaintiff in Wisconsin would have to rely
on the fourth and fifth exceptions to the consent rule to recover for
her own seduction. When consent to illicit sexual relations is induced
by a fraudulent promise of marriage, recovery should not be barred by
the breach of promise statute.
Only one case has faced this question directly. In Thibault v.
Lalumiere,8D plaintiff attempted to recover damages for caresses to
which her consent had been induced by defendant's fraudulent prom-
ises of marriage. The court held that the action was an attempt to
circumvent the Heart Balm act, and denied recovery.
If, as she now contends, her consent was procured by fraud of
the defendant in that he did not intend to perform his promise
to marry her, she could not maintain an action on account of
such acts committed during a courtship where the only ground
for contending that such acts constituted a wrong was his intent
not to carry out his promise to marry her and so was directly
attributable to the breach of contract to marry if, as will appear,
a statute declares that the breach of such a contract shall not be
deemed to be a legal wrong or injury....
The plaintiff's cause of action arises out of a breach of
been inflicted, he is still subject to liability for any bodily harm which results
from the contact to which he has fraudulently induced the actor to submit,
not because of any lack of consent to the contact, but because of the fraudu-
lent, and therefore tortius, means by which the assent has been procured, with
knowledge that the contact will or may prove harmful."
85 Winner v. Winner, 171 Wis. 413, 177 N.W. 680 (1920).
s' PROSSER, TORTS, §86 (2d ed. 1955).
s1 Graham v. Watts, 238 Ky. 96. 36 S.W. 2d 859 (1931) ; Flaherty v. Till, 119
.Minn. 191, 137 N.W. 815 (1912).884 Vernier, American Family Law 268 (1936).
89 Supra, note 65.
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promise of marriage, and she cannot circumvent the statute by
bringing an action in tort for damages so long as the direct or
underlying cause of her injury is the breach of promise of mar-
riage.9"
Thibault v. Lahmiere has been limited on this point by De Cicco v.
Barker.91
It was said in the Thibault opinion that §47A 'abolished any
right of action, whatever its form, that was based' . . . upon
breach of promise. Further consideration leads us to think that
the statement was too inclusive and that a proceeding may be
maintained which although occasioned by breach of contract to
marry, and in a sense based upon the breach, is not as was the
action in the Thibault case brought to recover for the breach
itself.
New York's statute, which has been construed to abolish any action
involving a broken promise of marriage, probably would not allow
recovery in this instance. California, which has allowed recovery for
damages caused by a fraudulent promise of marriage, 92 would probably
allow recovery for seduction as an element of damage in the deceit
action, and might allow recovery for a fraudulently induced seduction
alone.
Where fraud can be proven it does not do violence to the letter of
the Wisconsin Heart Balm act to allow recovery for seduction. Such
an action is based on the fraudulent intent at the time the promise is
made, not on the breach of the promise.9 3 The breach is merely cir-
cumstantial evidence that defendant never intended to perform his
promise. If the fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the breach,
the breach of promise has no legal significance. It is conceivable that
such fraudulent intent could be proven, even if the promise was not
breached.9 4
Allowing recovery for seduction will not offend the policy of
Chapter 248. These actions would be successful only in limited cir-
cumstances. Fraud must be proven by clear, satisfactory evidence. 95
It must be proven that defendant made the promise for the purpose
of inducing plaintiff's consent to the illicit sexual relations,9 6 and that
plaintiff relied on the promise when she gave her consent.97 A plaintiff
90 60 N.E. 2d 349, 350-351 (1945).
91 Supra, note 66.92 Langley v. Schumacher, 46 Cal. 2d 601, 297 P. 2d 977 (1956).
93 Supra, note 51.
94 For example, if defendant knew he could not perform his promise at the time
he made it because he was presently married, fraud could be established even
though the defendant had not yet breached his promise.
95 Estate of Hatten, 233 Wis. 199, 288 N.W. 278 (1940).
96 PRossER, TORTS, §88, (2d ed. 1955). For the misrepresentation to be action-
able, the person making it must intend, "... that it shall be acted upon




would be cautious in attempting a frivolous suit in the face of such a
great evidentiary burden. If she acted without probable cause she
could subject herself to a suit for abuse of process, and perhaps mali-
cious prosecution.08 Such suits would lend themselves to extortion no
more than any action based on morally reprehensible conduct. Allow-
ing these actions will not encourage unfortunate marriages. In such
cases, marriage was never intended, at least by the defendant. If
plaintiff cannot establish this, the cause fails. Although here the equities
are not as learly in favor of the plaintiff as they are in gift cases,
where plaintiff is not in pari delicto, allowing these actions would
tend to discourage fraud, and perhaps decrease the number of maidens
led astray by malevolent suitors.
C. RECOVERY FOR ECONOMIC INJURY CAUSED BY
A MISREPRESENTED INTENT TO MARRY.
Jurisdictions are divided on whether the Heart Balm acts abolish
recovery in deceit for economic damages caused by a fraudulent prom-
ise of marriage. Few courts have ruled on this question.
New York, in Sulkowski v. Szewczyk"9 denied recovery. In that
case, defendant represented to plaintiff that he was unmarried and
eligible to marry her. In reality, defendant was a married man. Plain-
tiff brought action to recover her damages resulting from this false
representation, but the court held that the suit was an attempt to cir-
cumvent the Heart Balm act.
If plaintiff's contention be correct, then any action based upon
a breach of promise to marry could be turned into an action for
misrepresentations by merely alleging that the promise of mar-
riage was a sham, made solely for the purpose of taking advan-
tage of plaintiff....
It follows that Article 2-a was intended to prohibit the main-
tenance of such actions as the one under consideration .... It is
the purpose of the statute to abolish actions 'based' upon a
breach of contract to marry. Certainly if there has not been a
promise of marriage by the defendant and a failure to keep such
promise, there is not any basis for this action.' 0
Subsequently, a United States District Court, in Pennsylvania, apply-
ing both New York and Pennsylvania law, reached a similar decision,
based on the Sulkowski case. 1° 1
This position has had unfortunate results. In Easley v. Meal,0 2
98 5Myhre v. Hessey, 242 Wis. 638, 9 N.W. 2d 106, 150 A.L.R. 889; Novick v.
Becker, 4 Wis. 2d 432, 90 N.W. 2d 620 (1958). Injury to reputation might by
sufficient special damage to maintain a suit for malicious prosecution in Wis-
consin.
99 255 App. Div. 103, 6 N.Y.S. 2d 97 (1938).
100 6 N.Y.S. 2d 97, 98-99.
lol A. B. v. C. D., 36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
102 110 N.Y.S. 2d 191 (S. Ct. 1952).
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plaintiff, father of the bride, was induced to expend money to prepare
for his daughter's marriage, in reliance on defendant's represented
intent to marry her. Defendant, however, was already married. Plain-
tiff's claim was denied. It is doubtful that the New York Legislature
intended to subject honest men to the machinations of scoundrels, and
such a result is hardly required to effectuate the policy of Heart Balm
acts.
The opposite view is held by California, and possibly Massachu-
setts. In Langley v .Schumacher °3 the California court allowed a
plaintiff to recover damages caused by a fraudulent promise of mar-
riage. There, defendant induced plaintiff to marry him upon his false
representation that he intended to assume normal marital obligations.
Defendant never intended to consummate the marriage, which plaintiff
did not discover until after the ceremony. Plaintiff obtained an annul-
ment of the marriage for fraud, and brought an action to recover for
her damages. Although the factual situation in this case differs slightly
from the normal breach of promise suit, in that defendant \went
through the ceremony, the court disregarded this difference, and faced
the issue of whether the action was barred by the California Heart
Balm act.
The language of the code section [abolishing breach of promise
actions] indicates that it was only intended to abolish causes of
action based on an alleged breach of contract. The plaintiff's
complaint states a cause of action for fraud-the making of
promises without any intention of performing them. . . . Such a
cause of action is not barred by section 43.5, subdivision (d). 1"
Plaintiff sought $15,000 for her actual financial detriment, and $10,000
punitive damages, for her humiliation, public disgrace, and mental
anguish.
In De Cicco v. Barker,10 5 the Massachusetts court used language
(quoted supra) indicating that it may allow recovery in such actions,
as long as recovery is not sought for the breach itself. Since, as pre-
viously mentioned, the breach of the engagement promise is no more
than some evidence of fraud, actions to recover in deceit are not to
recover for the breach of such promises, and Massachusetts conceiv-
ably could allow recovery.
It is apparent that the Legislative Council, which drafted Bill 151A,
the Wisconsin Family Code, intended not to abolish these actions for
deceit.
An action for deceit may be brought where there has been inten-
tional misrepresentation resulting in monetary loss.10 6
103 Supra, note 92.
104 297 P. 2d 977, 979 (1956).
105 Supra, note 66.
206 Supra, note 74.
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Although this comment was written with reference to 248.06, the
statute which provides for recovery of property obtained by fraud,
it is obviously inapplicable to that statute. 248.06 provides for recovery
of property ,received by the defrauding party. The action for deceit
gives relief in damages. 10 7 Recovery of the property could be had by
replevin or restitution, but not by deceit. That the defendant received
the property is immaterial to an action for deceit. Recovery may be
had, even though defendant realized no benefit from his fraud. 08 Thus
the intent of the legislature, as expressly stated in the original bill,
would seem to allow an action for deceit for monetary loss caused by
a fraudulent promise of marriage.
The action for deceit does not violate the purpose of the Heart
Balm act. Here the court is not dealing with an innocent suitor who
feels he is contemplating an unfortunate marriage, but a person who
intentionally lied to the plaintiff with the purpose in mind of inducing
him or her to be financially detrimented. Fear of extortion should not
allow a wrongdoer to freely perform his pranks.
There are two measures of damages used in granting recovery for
deceit. The tort, or "out-of-pocket" measure1 9 allows plaintiff to re-
cover his actual financial loss, such as expenses in preparing for the
wedding, a favorable economic situation lost, or losses from benefits
conferred on the prospective spouse. This measure is used when the
representation did not induce making a contract. The second measure
is the contract, or "benefit-of-the-bargain" measure" used when the
misrepresentation induced a contract. Here plaintiff recovers the bene-
fit of the promised performance, as well as actual losses. In addition
to the normal measure of damages, plaintiff can ordinarily recover
consequential damages proximately caused by the misrepresentation'
such as damages for seduction, or bruised feelings. The Legislative
Council probably did not intend to limit recovery in Wisconsin to the
normal, monetary measure of damages. Although deceit is ordinarily
brought to recover financial losses," 2 once this loss is established, con-
sequential losses, even though non-economic, are generally compen-
sated. The clause of the council report "resulting in monetary loss"
affirms the generally held principal that before consequential damages
are recoverable, there must first be a monetary loss. These words do not
convey the impression that consequential damages are to be barred.
A third party who incurred damages as a result of the misrepre-
sented intent can ordinarily recover if he can show his reliance and
107 PRossER, ToRTs, §86 (2d ed. 1955).
108 Id. §88.
109 Id. §91.
310 Anderson v. Tri-State Home Improvement Co., 268 Wis. 455, 67 N.W. 2d
853, 68 N.W. 2d 705 (1955).
"'PRossER, ToRTs, §91 (2d ed. 1955).
112 Supra, note 86.
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conduct were intended by the defendant.11 3 The above quoted comment
of the Legislative Council does not limit the person entitled to sue
for deceit to the engaged party. Thus a parent could recover for
money given defendant pursuant to a fraudulent promise of marriage,
or for expenses incurred in preparing for the wedding.
The action for deceit is not necessarily an attempted evasion of the
breach of promise statute. Our court might hesitate in allowing dam-
ages for the lost financial benefit of the marriage, but such recovery
could be avoided by using the tort measure of damages for out of
pocket expenses, and consequential injuries. Consequential damages
for mere sentimental bruises resulting from the fraud, by way of
heart balm, might justifiably seem obnoxious to our court, but in jus-
tice, this should not prevent recovery for actual financial losses and
consequential personal injuries, indignities, or physical illness from
emotional distress of the jilted and defrauded suitor.
D. RECOVERY FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS RESULTING
FROM A BREACH OF PROMISE.
A plaintiff should recover for severe emotional distress caused by
a flagrant breach of the engagement promise. Recent cases have al-
lowed recovery for outrageous conduct intentionally causing severe
emotional distress, not merely as an element of damages, but as an
independent tort.' The mental anguish must be extreme;"' mere
injured feelings are not compensated. Not every breach is actionable.
Defendant's conduct must be outrageous 16 and intended to affect
plaintiff, or the effect must be substantially certain to follow. 1 7 Thus
a defendant who entered the engagement as a practical joke, or leaves
his bride at the altar under extreme circumstances, or abusively breaks
the engagement, knowing his fiancee is peculiarly susceptible to emo-
tional distress" 8 would be liable for her extreme mental reactions, and
any resulting physical illness.
Wisconsin allows recovery for intentionally caused emotional dis-
tress only if there is a resulting physical illness." 9 Our court has not
faced this question recently, however, and it is likely, in view of the
recent developments in this law, that it would allow recovery for a
severe disturbance intentionally inflicted without resulting personal
injury.120
113 PROSSER, ToRTS, §88 (2d ed. 1955).
14 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, 2d, Tentative Draft, §46 (1957). "One who by extreme
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress and for
bodily harm resulting from it."
115 Id. comment j. 116 Id. comment d.
117 Id. comment i. 11s Id. comment f.
"19 Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900).
120 Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P. 2d 349 (1954) ; Wilson v. Wilkins, 181
Ark. 137, 25 S.W. 2d 428 (1930).
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Such- recoveries should not be barred by the breach of promise
statute. Recovery here is not contractual, but is based on duties im-
posed by the law to protect the interest of mental tranquility. A de-
fendant would not-be liable for a circumspect breach of the engage-
ment promise. He should be liable for his outrageous conduct.
E. SATISFACTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF
SUBSTANTIAL REmEDY.
Chapter 248 does not effect the recovery of engagement gifts.
Although this chapter prevents plaintiff from recovering for her own
seduction as an element of damages in a breach of promise action, she
can recover if her consent was obtained by a fraudulent promise of
marriage. Economic losses, and consequential injuries incurred as a
result of defendant's fraudulent marriage promise are recoverable.
Plaintiff can also recover for severe emotional distress if the promise
is breached under outrageous circumstances.
Although chapter 248 materially affects remedies formally available
to a jilted suitor, it does not substantially impair them. Plaintiff is
denied recovery for the prospective value of the marriage, and for
slight emotional' bruises. The injured party is denied recovery for
personal indignities and economic losses when defendant's marriage
promise was not fraudulent. The law leaves the parties where it finds
them if the equities between them are equal. But it allows substantial
remedies if extreme injustice would otherwise result.
Therefore, the abolition of the common law action for breach of
promise, though limiting the right of recovery, still leaves important
rights available in the areas of gifts, seduction, financial losses, and
severe emotional disturbances. It appears that these rights, when con-
sidered in total, leave substantial remedies available to injured parties
and satisfy the requirements of the Wisconsin Constitution.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PENALTY PROVISIONS
In abolishing breach of promise actions, the legislature made it
unlawful for any party or attorney to commence or threaten to com-
mence an action for breach of promise, and provided a penalty of not
less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or imprisonment of not more than
one year, or both. 121 The validity of this type of provision has been
upheld by most states, but without a statement of reasons justifying
this conclusion.
122
rt is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that the consti-
tutional validity of a legislative act can only be determined by the judi-
cial branch. Therefore, Pennington v. Stewart declared the penal pro-
vision of the Indiana Heart. Balm act unconstitutional as it curtailed
121 Chap. 595, Laws of 1959, §248.03, .07.
122 Bunten v. Bunten, supra, note 15.
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the right to resort to the courts to test the validity of a legislative
enactment.
Any person whose rights are prejudiced by the operation of
a statute may raise the question as to its constitutionality ...
Prior to the enactment of the act in question it was undoubtedly
the law in this state that one had the right to file an action in any
court of competent jurisdiction for alienation of affections.
The right was abolished by the act, and certainly the appellant
has the right to test its validity.
The practical effect of section 8 of the act under considera-
tion is to deny and prohibit one from contesting the constitu-
tionality of the act. If this is a lawful exercise of legislative
power, then the constitutionality of all acts of the Legislature
could be prevented from being tested by a similar penalty provi-
sion being enacted in such act. The Legislature cannot enact
a law and at the same time pass upon its constitutionality. It is
for the courts to pass on this question.
123
This fundamental principle has been expressed by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Bonnett v. Vallies:
There is another general feature of the act which arrests our
attention and that is the penal clause, particularly in view of the
recent decision of the federal supreme court, that where a police
regulation is sought to be made effective by danger of such pun-
ishment for violations thereof and such burdens upon unsuccess-
ful efforts even to test its validity as to intimidate parties affected
thereby from resorting to the courts in the matter, as to practi-
cally prohibit them from seeking any judicial remedy for sup-
posed wrongs inflicted upon them, it denies to them equal pro-
tection of the laws and renders the whole act void irrespective
of whether its provisions would otherwise be valid.
24
The United States Supreme Court decision referred to by the
Wisconsin Court was Ex parte Young. 12 5 It declared that a penal pro-
vision is valid only in cases where "the jurisdiction of the legislature
is complete in any event." 126 It has been the purpose of this article to
indicate that when a common law remedy has been entirely abolished,
the jurisdiction of the legislature is not "complete in any event." On
the contrary, it is imperative that the courts determine that a substan-
tial remedy is left to injured parties. This was stated in Von Baum-
bach v. Bade:
The legislature having power within the limits above stated, to
control, at their pleasure, the remedy, are, in the first instance,
to determine for themselves whether any change or modification
of remedy is necessary, and if so, what change, and whether
parties to contracts are left with a substantial remedy according
123 Supra, Note 19, at 623.
124 136 Wis. 193, 209-210, 116 N.W. 885, 890 (1908).
125 209 U.S. 123 (1907).
126 Id. at 148.
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to the laws as they existed before such change, subject to a revi-
sion in the last particular by the courts."27 [Emphasis added].
Until the limits of these substantial remedies previously discussed in
this article are clearly defined by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, there
also remains the great possibility of innocent violations of chapter 248.
For example, an attorney may commence an action for severe emo-
tional distress, justly believing that his particular case was unaffected
by chapter 248, only to discover that it was encompassed within its
scope, leaving the attorney subject to the penalty provision. If this
were true, the effect would be to cast a shadow over this entire area
of legal rights, supported by the fear of liability under the penalty
clause for the mere threat to file an action. In this respect, Bonnett v.
Vallies declared:
The effect of it would be to take property without due process
of law, to violate sec. 9, art. I, of the state constitution guaran-
teeing to every person a certain remedy in the law for all injuries
or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or
character, and to violate every principle of civil liberty en-
trenched in the constitution . 2
Consequently, it is extremely doubtful whether this penalty sec-
tion of chapter 248 is constitutional or whether it is "especially
obnoxious because it attempts to bar resort to the courts to test the
constitutionality of the Act.""29 It appears to be the latter, particularly
in view of the well established principle of legal construction that
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed.130
If the penalty provision is unconstitutional, does it necessarily
follow that the entire chapter is unconstitutional? Pennington v.
Stewart declared that it did not."' The reason for this conclusion was
that the Indiana act expressly provided that each section of the act was
to be separately construed. Since the penalty sections were not inter-
woven into the entire act, only the penalty sections were held invalid.
Bonnett v. Vallies can be distinguished since there the Wisconsin
Court found the penal provision 'pervaded and condemned' the entire
act, indicating that only the penal clause would have been condemned
had it been otherwise.13
In chapter 248, it expressly provides that the entire chapter is to be
liberally construed to effectuate its purpose. 33 Its purpose is to abolish
breach of promise actions. This cannot be said to be dependent solely
upon the penalty provision, for if the remaining sections of chapter 248
127 Supra, note 35, at 579.
"Supra, note 124, at 212, 116 N.W. at 891.
129 Wilder v. Reno, supra, note 3, at 728.
"3oSupra, note 69.
31 Supra, note 19.
132 Supra, note 124, at 212, 116 N.W. at 891.
133 Supra, note 73.
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are upheld, the traditional rules of pleading will provide the chapter
with the means to accomplish this purpose. Therefore, if the construc-
tion provision is followed, like it was in Pennington v. Stewart, the
remaining sections of chapter 248 would be constitutional.
CONCLUSION
The abolition of breach of promise is an impairment of contract
obligations, prohibited by both state and federal constitutions, unless
it can be justified as an exercise of the police power for the public
welfare. Chapter 248 is legislation enacted for the public welfare to
prevent actions which encourage unstable marriages and conduct bor-
dering on extortion. But Article I, Section 9, of the Wisconsin Con-
stitution, guaranteeing a remedy for wrongs to person or property, is
a limitation on the scope of police power, requiring a substantial rem-
edy to be left for previously recognized wrongs at common law. When
breach of promise actions were abolished, a common law action was
abrogated, and it is necessary that an adequate substitute remains to
meet this constitutional requirement. It appears that substantial rem-
edies still remain. Actions to recover for engagement gifts, and dam-
ages for severe emotional distress can still be brought. If plaintiff
can prove a fraudulent promise of marriage, recovery may be had for
seduction and for economic losses.
The penalty clause of chapter 248, however, appears to violate the
fundamental principle that when legislation is enacted which takes
away a legal right, injured parties have the right to test its constitu-
tionality in the courts. The penalty provision is a curtailment of that
basic right, and so discourages contesting the validity and the scope of
chapter 248 that its constitutionality is greatly doubted. This does not
mean that the entire chapter must be condemned, but rather, by
liberally construing this act, the penalty provision is severable from the
remaining sections. In this manner, the legislative object-the abolition
of breach of promise for the protection of the general public could be
accomplished, and chapter 248 could then be upheld as a new step in
Wisconsin toward preserving the sancity of the marriage institution.
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